September 2005

ABSTRACT

The objectives of this study were to 1) fully document what happened during the response by the emergency services to the attacks on the WTC, up to the time of collapse of WTC 7...

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 5

5.9 Emergency Response Operations at World Trade Center 7......................................................... 108

Genesis of This Investigation

The goals of the investigation of the WTC disaster were:

• To investigate the building construction, the materials

The specific objectives were:

1. Determine why and how WTC 1 and WTC 2 collapsed following the initial impacts of the aircraft and why and how WTC 7 collapsed;

3. Determine what procedures and practices were used in the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of WTC 1, 2, and 7

NIST’s WTC Public-Private Response Plan

The strategy to meet this goal is a three-part NIST-led public-private response program that includes:

• A federal building and fire safety investigation to study the most probable factors that contributed to post-aircraft impact collapse of the WTC towers and the 47-story WTC 7 building, and the associated evacuation and emergency response experience.

Changes Made by FDNY Following the February 1993 WTC Bombing

Interagency Protocols: The New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM) was established, and it took on the job of promoting the improvement of interagency operations; however, on September 11, 2001, the OEM center located at WTC 7 became ineffective as WTC 7 was evacuated by the emergency response personnel.

Coordination of Response Activities with Other Authorities at the World Trade Center:

The Office of Emergency Management (OEM) was established in New York City after the 1993 bombing, in part, to promote unified operations between and among the various city emergency responder departments. On the morning of September 11, 2001, OEM operations were disrupted with the loss of the
city’s OEM operations center located inside WTC 7. Since the OEM center was not available for operations, NYPD, FDNY, and OEM Commissioners met the Mayor on the street with the group initially assembling at Barclay Street. At the same time, NYPD was establishing an alternate command center for the Mayor and his staff at 75 Barclay Street so that he and his staff could oversee operations. (Giuliani 2002). However, their operations from 75 Barclay Street were disrupted by the collapse of the towers, and they had to quickly evacuate from that site. Data show that there was no formal structure of unified command between departments below the Mayor and Commissioner level of operations. FDNY and NYPD department chiefs were not working together at the same command post, and they did not formulate unified orders or directions for their departments.

The coordination of communications and operations between the responding authorities at the WTC was a challenge for all emergency responders working that morning. The short time frame related to the attack and emergency responder operations coupled with successive significant threats requiring response (an aircraft hitting WTC 2 after WTC 1 was hit, the possible threat of a third aircraft coming in, the collapse of WTC 2, etc.) compounded the difficulty of establishing a unified operation. The challenges related to the establishment of unified operations were made significantly worse when the OEM facility located inside WTC 7 had to be evacuated.

1.2 TECHNICAL APPROACH

Task 4. Report preparation:

• Project 5. Reconstruction of Thermal and Tenability Environment. Information from emergency responders on conditions in stairwells and other areas of the towers and WTC 7.

• Project 6. Structural Fire Response and Collapse Analysis (regarding WTC 7 only). Information from first-person interviews on the damage inflicted on WTC 7 by the collapse of WTC 1 and WTC 2.

For response to World Trade Center Building 7:

• Each emergency responder was asked to describe their experience in their own words and end their narrative after the WTC 7 collapse.

8:46 a.m. An aircraft strikes WTC 1. (FEMA 403)

9:01 a.m. WTC Security receives a report of a fire in a parking lot. (PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X)

9:02 a.m. WTC Security receives a report of a gas leak. (Note: Incomplete message, location of leak not identified.) (PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X)

9:03 a.m. An aircraft strikes WTC 2. (FEMA 403) PAPD – by this time a PAPD senior officer has called three times for the evacuation of the World Trade Center, WTC 1 and WTC 2, and then “all buildings in the complex.” (PAPD Radio Channel W)

WTC Security reports that another aircraft has stuck WTC 2. (PA/WTC Security Radio
Channel X)

9:44 a.m. WTC Security receives a communication saying that “They haven’t evacuated the Fire Command over here in building 2 or 1.” (PA/WTC Security Radio Channel X)

9:44 a.m. (E) The Office of Emergency Management operations center inside WTC 7 is evacuated. (FDNY, interview 24, winter 2004)

9:54 a.m. FDNY radio communications on the City-wide, high-rise Channel 7 (PA/WTC Radio Channel 30) A Battalion Chief calls for a Ladder company in the A stairway to extinguish two fires. They are attempting to stretch building hose lines on about floor 78. (PA/WTC Radio Channel 30 recording)

FDNY radio communications on the City-wide, high-rise Channel 7 (PA/WTC Radio Channel 30) A firefighter calls to the Battalion Chief that he is on floor 55 and must stop to rest. (PA/WTC Radio Channel 30 recording)

9:56 a.m. FDNY radio communications on the City-wide, high-rise Channel 7 (PA/WTC Radio Channel 30): inside WTC 2, a firefighter states they are in the B stairway and that they will have to put some fire out in order to get to the A stairway. (PA/WTC Radio Channel 30 recording)

9:59 a.m. FDNY Marine unit reports the collapse of WTC 2. (FDNY World Trade Center Incident Summary, 2001)

10:28 a.m. FDNY Marine unit advises that the second WTC tower collapsed. (FDNY World Trade Center Incident Summary, 2001)

8:57 a.m. PAPD police desk receives report that water pipes are broken on the B4 level of WTC 1. (PAPD Radio Channel W)

9:10 a.m. PAPD police desk receives a report that there is burning jet fuel on floor 51 of one of the towers. (Note: Communications suggest this is WTC 2.) (PAPD Radio Channel W)

9:41 a.m. NYPD dispatcher advises units that floor 106 in WTC 2 is collapsing and that the message comes from someone on that floor. (NYPD Division 1 Radio Channel)

9:47 a.m. FDNY radio communications on the City-wide, high-rise Channel 7 (PA/WTC Radio Channel 30): a firefighter inside WTC 2 reports that he is standing in the B stairway on floor 74 and there is no smoke or fire problem. He reports that the stairway walls have been breached on floors 73 and 74. Another FDNY unit in the same stairway reports that the walls were also breached on floor 68. (PA/WTC Radio Channel 30 recording)

9:51 a.m. NYPD dispatcher advises that at WTC 2, floor 106 is crumbling per communications with victims trapped on the floor. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel)

9:58 a.m. NYPD aviation unit advises that the south tower is coming down. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel)

10:06 a.m. NYPD officer advises that it isn’t going to take much longer before the north tower comes down and to pull emergency vehicles back from the building. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel)

10:20 a.m. NYPD aviation unit reports that the top of the tower might be leaning. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel)

10:21 a.m. NYPD aviation unit reports that the north tower is buckling on the southwest corner and leaning to the south. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel)

NYPD officer advises that all personnel close to the building pull back three blocks in every direction. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel)

10:27 a.m. NYPD aviation unit reports that the roof is going to come down very shortly. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel)

10:28 a.m. NYPD officer reports that the tower is collapsing. (NYPD SOD Radio Channel)

5.9 EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATIONS AT WORLD TRADE CENTER 7

World Trade Center 7 (WTC 7) was an important building with regard to the attack on the World Trade Center. The New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM) was located on the 3rd and 23rd floors of WTC 7.³⁶⁶ The OEM office on the 23rd floor contained the emergency operations post for OEM and was designed to function as a command center to help coordinate multi-agency operations at incidents in the city.³⁶⁷ (Sheirer 2004) On September 11, 2001, WTC 7 became threatened as the WTC complex was attacked.

When the first aircraft struck WTC 1, the electrical power went out for several seconds inside WTC 7.³⁶⁸ Many people immediately began leaving the building, and the OEM operations center began receiving calls related to the emergency.³⁶⁹ As the second aircraft struck WTC 2, a decision was made to evacuate WTC 7.³⁷⁰ By the time WTC 2 was struck by the second aircraft at 9:03 a.m., many WTC 7 occupants had already left the building and others had begun a self-evacuation of the building. Shortly after WTC 2 was struck, a firefighter entered WTC 7 from the Washington and Vesey Streets side, connected a hose line onto the “A” stairwell sprinkler riser and started the Engines pumps.³⁷¹ At approximately 9:30 a.m., FDNY, EMS established a Division for assisting victims at WTC 7.³⁷² An EMS triage center was established in the lobby of WTC 7 as occupants from WTC 1 and WTC 6 evacuated through WTC 7.³⁷³ At approximately 9:44 a.m., after the report of a third aircraft heading into the city and news that the Pentagon had been attacked, a Deputy OEM Commissioner ordered the complete evacuation of WTC 7. (Sheirer 2004) This order included the evacuation of the OEM operations center on the 23rd floor. The loss of the OEM operations center created difficulties related to the coordination of emergency responder operations and resources.³⁷⁴ Before the OEM operations center was evacuated, OEM had assigned personnel to work with each of the emergency responder command posts. This reduced the impact of the loss of the WTC 7 OEM office. (See Chapter 8.) Occupants evacuating from WTC 7 used both the elevators and stairways as they left the building.³⁷⁵ Shortly after WTC 7 was evacuated, the FDNY Fire Commissioner arrived, looking for the Mayor who he believed to be at the OEM center on the 23rd floor. A guard met the Commissioner in the lobby and ordered him and his staff out of the building. The guard told him, “This building has been evacuated.” and that “OEM, the mayor, they’re all gone.” (Von Essen 2002)

At 9:59 a.m., WTC 2 collapsed, and debris from the collapse struck the south face of WTC 7.³⁷⁶ At 10:28 a.m., WTC 1 collapsed and a significant amount of damage was done to WTC 7.³⁷⁷ A large amount of debris crashed through the front center of the building from approximately the 10th floor down to ground level, and debris ripped a part of the southwest corner off from approximately the 8th floor up to the 18th floor.³⁷⁸ The collapse of WTC 1 also appears to be responsible for starting fires inside of WTC 7.³⁷⁹ With the collapse of the two towers, a New York City employee and a WTC 7 building staff
person became trapped inside of WTC 7.³⁸⁰ The two had gone to the OEM center on the 23rd floor and found no one there. As they went to get into an elevator to go downstairs the lights inside of WTC 7 flickered as WTC 2 collapsed. At this point, the elevator they were attempting to catch no longer worked, so they started down the staircase. When they got to the 6th floor, WTC 1 collapsed, the lights went out in the staircase, the sprinklers came on briefly, and the staircase filled with smoke and debris. The two men went back to the 8th floor broke out a window and called for help. Firefighters on the ground saw them and went up the stairs. In addition, a security officer for one of the businesses in the building was also was trapped on the 7th floor by the smoke in the stairway. As the firefighters went up, they vented the stairway and cleared some of the smoke. They first met the security officer on the 7th floor and firefighters escorted him down the stairs. Other firefighters from the group continued up the stairs, shined their flashlight through the staircase smoke and called out. The two trapped men on the 8th floor saw the flashlight beam and heard the firefighters calling and went down the stairway. The firefighters took the men outside and directed them away from the building.³⁸¹

At approximately 11:30 a.m., FDNY assigned a Chief Officer to take charge of operations at WTC 7. The Chief was initially given orders to put the fires out in WTC 7.³⁸² From the Chief’s assigned location at WTC 7, he reported that looking south toward WTC 7, they could not see the building because of the large smoke and dust cloud. The Chief Officer was able to negotiate the debris fields, get to the building, and see the WTC 7 logo on the side. There were numerous burned out FDNY vehicles around WTC 7. At the corner of Vesey and West Broadway, a FDNY Engine was connected to a hydrant at the corner of WTC 7. Hose lines were stretched, and the Engine’s pump was still running even though the Engine was on fire and was almost burned out. There was no water coming out of the hydrant system.³⁸³ One FDNY Chief Officer that entered WTC 7 indicated that he opened a standpipe on the 4th floor of one stairway and found no water in the standpipe system.³⁸⁴ A FDNY fire boat and the retired FDNY fire boat “Harvey” were located at the shore on the Hudson River near the site. They were starting to stretch lines up to the WTC.³⁸⁵ According to the FDNY first-person interviews, water was never an issue at WTC 7 since firefighting was never started in the building.³⁸⁶ When the Chief Officer in charge of WTC 7 got to Barclay Street and West Broadway, numerous firefighters and officers were coming out of WTC 7. These firefighters indicated that several blocks needed to be cleared around WTC 7 because they thought
that the building was going to collapse.³⁸⁷

Con Edison personnel arrived at the scene and consulted with FDNY. They wanted to know if they should cut the power off at the WTC 7 power station. It was decided to leave the power on and not allow Con Edison personnel to enter WTC 7 because it was not safe.³⁸⁸ The Con Edison personnel also indicated that fuel tanks were located in the lower level of WTC 7. However, they could not determine if the fuel tanks were involved with the fires burning in the building. FDNY personnel reported that they did not see any indication of burning liquid fuels before the building collapsed.³⁸⁹ No accurate time is between approximately 12:00 noon and 2:00 p.m.

One Battalion Chief coming from the building indicated that they had searched floors 1 through 9 and found that the building was clear.³⁹⁰ In the process of the search, the Battalion Chief met the building’s Fire Safety Director and Deputy Fire Safety Director on the ninth floor. The Fire Safety Director reported that the building’s floors had been cleared from the top down. By this time, the Chief Officer responsible for WTC 7 reassessed the building again and determined that fires were burning on the following floors:  6, 7, 8, 17, 21, and 30.³⁹¹ No accurate time is available for these actions during the WTC 7 operations; however, the sequence of event indicates that it occurred during a time period from 12:30 p.m. to approximately 2:00 p.m.

The Chief Officer then met with his command officer to discuss the building’s condition and FDNY’s capabilities for controlling the building fires. A Deputy Chief who had just returned from inside the building reported that he had conducted an inspection up to the 7th or 8th floor.³⁹² He indicated that the stairway was filling with smoke and that there was a lot of fire inside the building. The chiefs discussed the situation and the following conditions were identified: ^{393, 394}

• The building had sustained damage from debris falling into the building, and they were not sure about the structural stability of the building.

• The building had large fires burning on at least six floors. Any one of these six fires would have been considered a large incident during normal FDNY operations.

• There was no water immediately available for fighting the fires.

• They didn’t have equipment, hose, standpipe kits, tools, and enough handie talkies for conducting operations inside the building.

At approximately, 2:30 p.m., FDNY officers decided to completely abandon WTC 7, and the final order was given to evacuate the site around the building. ^{395, 396} The order terminated the ongoing rescue operations at WTC 6 and on the rubble pile of WTC 1. Firefighters and other emergency responders were withdrawn from the WTC 7 area, and the building continued to burn. At approximately 5:20 p.m., some three hours after WTC 7 was abandoned the building experienced a catastrophic failure and collapsed.

On the morning of September 11, 2001, OEM operations were disrupted with the evacuation of the city’s OEM operations center located inside WTC 7.⁸ The FDNY Fire Commissioner stated the following concerning the loss of the OEM center when he was turned away from WTC 7 shortly after it had been
evacuated:

“How ridiculous, I thought. We’ve got a thirteen-million-dollar command center and we can’t even use it.” (Von Essen 2002)

Since the OEM center was not available for operations, NYPD, FDNY, and OEM Commissioners met the Mayor on the street with the group initially assembling at Barclay Street. At the same time, NYPD was establishing an alternate command center for the Mayor and his staff at 75 Barclay Street so that he and his staff could oversee operations. However, their operations from 75 Barclay Street were disrupted by the collapse of the towers, and they had to quickly evacuate from that site.

On September 11, 2001, the OEM Operations Center located inside WTC 7 on the 23rd floor was disrupted when the building underwent an emergency evacuation after the second hijacked aircraft struck WTC 2. As a result, this center became unusable and the operations of the OEM office became less than totally effective until after WTC 1 and 2 collapsed. This loss of OEM operations had a negative impact on interagency operations during WTC operations. As the Mayor learned of OEM’s evacuation, he immediately devised two priorities: 1) set up a new OEM Command Center, and 2) find a way to communicate with the people of New York City (Giuliani 2002).

Attachment 2

8:46 a.m. Aircraft strikes WTC 1 on north side causing serious building damage and starting fires on floors 94 through 98. (FEMA 403)

8:49 a.m. WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “10-4, S4, I understand there may have been an explosion on Liberty Street.”

8:49 a.m. WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “Stay off the air.”

8:54:22 WTC Security radio report, PA Channel X – “… (?)… Do you know basically where the plane hit the building?” (Note: Two unreadable transmissions follow.) “…(?)… By the side right over the … (?)…” “Come back, I didn’t read your transmission. It is on the side of Building Six Tower One.” “…(?)… One hundred One floor you said?” “ … (?)… I got too much… (?)… Here, if you can hear me … (?)… Can you hear me with so much commotion?” “What floor? …(?)… Building Seven. …(?)… Hit Building Seven.” “No it hit World Trade Center One but … (?)… Building Seven. Copy?” “What floor did it hit?” “….(?)… All the way at the top … (?) … and above.” (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log)

9:01:58 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “Evacuate all buildings in the complex. You copy? All buildings in the complex.” “Roger. Units evacuate all units, all tenants in the buildings, at the Trade, at the Trade Center.”

9:03 a.m. Aircraft strikes WTC 2 on the south side causing serious building damage and starting fires on floors 78 through 84. (FEMA 403)

9:04:50 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “We have visual on that. Not known if it was a second plane, possibly a missile.”

9:06:31 PAPD Police Desk radio report, PA Channel W – “Units on channel W, this is 8581 Sierra. There’s been a reported missile launching from the Woolworth Building. CPD, if you are monitoring, get in touch with New York City. Have them check the Woolworth Building roof top.

9:40 - 9:49 Chief at WTC 7 is told that WTC buildings could collapse, and he dispatches someone to tell the chiefs on West Street. (FDNY Interviews # 45 and #46, winter 2004)

9:40 Engine 162 (post collapse operations WTC 1 and WTC 2, operations at WTC 7, hydrant at Church and Vesey Streets, stretched line to WTC 7)

9:44 a.m. (E) The Office of Emergency Management operations center inside WTC 7 is evacuated. (FDNY, interview 24, winter 2004)

9:47:00 FDNY radio communication, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater: - “Battalion 7 to Battalion 9” “Battalion 9 to Battalion 7” “…?… These stairway walls have been compromised on 73 and 74. No smoke or fire problems, K.” “OK, 10-4”

9:47:44 FDNY radio communications, PA, WTC Channel 30 repeater – “One Five to Battalion 7” “Go ahead, Ladder One Five” “What do ya got up there Chief?” “I’m standing in Boy stairway on the 74th floor, no smoke or fire problem. The walls are breached so be careful.” “Yea, 10-4, I saw that on 68. We’re on 71. We’re coming up behind ya.” “OK, …? … six more to go.” “Let me know when you see fire.”

9:59 a.m. WTC 2 building collapse. (FEMA 403)

WTC 1, some firefighters up inside the building as high as the 36th floor hear an urgent order over their radios to evacuate. It is heard over the command radio channel. Multiple companies start down the stairs. (FDNY interviews #16, #39, #41, winter 2004)

10:00 – 10:09 WTC 1 - A firefighter, possibly from Ladder 3, reports over the radio a collapse on a floor in the 60’s. It is the highest floor reported as being reached in the building. (New York Time, website, timeline)

10:06 Box 0320, (FDNY Box Alarm Dispatch log and CD12/CD15) Engine 160 (post collapse operations, supplied water to two Tower Ladders operating on WTC 7)

10:07 a.m. NYPD helicopters hovering near WTC 1 to check its condition radios, “About 15 floors down from the top, it looks like its glowing red.” Aviation 14, radioed at 10:07 a.m. “It’s inevitable.” Seconds later, another pilot (Aviation 6) reported: “I don’t think this has too much longer to go. I would evacuate all people within the area of that second building.” (New York Times)

NYPD helicopters: Aviation 6 warns that WTC 1 collapse is likely, and advises immediate evacuation. (NYPD, McKinsey & Company)

10:12 Box 1377, location of Alarm Box, Columbia and Woodhull Streets,
Engine 518 (post collapse operations, stretched hoselines and operated in WTC 7)
Ladder 148 (post collapse Command Post operations, Broadway and Vesey streets)

10:22:18 10-84, Engine 160, (post collapse operations, supplied water to two Tower Ladders operating on WTC 7)

10:29 a.m. WTC 1 building collapse. (FEMA, 403)

11:19 Ladder 84 (reported to Command Post at Broadway and Vesey Streets, search of 5 WTC, operated Tower Ladder at Church and Vesey Streets on 5 WTC and WTC 7

5:20:33 WTC 7 building begins to collapse. (FEMA 403)

5:21:10 p.m. WTC 7 building complete collapse. (FEMA 403)

5:21:11 FDNY Field Comm 1 reports major collapse of World Trade Center Building #7. (FDNY World Trade Center Incident Summary notes)

Attachment 3

Ch. 00WTC 7 phone 435-2135 TC.wav

Ch. 01WTC 7 direct line fire command WTC 1.wav

Ch. 02WTC 7 radio Ch. X.wav

Ch. 03WTC 7.wav